Mereology is the study of parts and the relationships that hold between them. We introduce a behavioral approach to mereology, in which systems and their parts are known only by the types of behavior they can exhibit. Our discussion is formally topos-theoretic, and agnostic to the topos, providing maximal generality; however, by using only its internal logic we can hide the details and readers may assume a completely elementary set-theoretic discussion. We consider the relationship between various parts of a whole in terms of how behavioral constraints are passed between them, and give an inter-modal logic that generalizes the usual alethic modalities in the setting of symmetric accessibility.
Introduction
Many thinkers, from Heidegger to Isham and Döring have asked "What is a thing?" [1, 2] . Heidegger for example says, From the range of the basic questions of metaphysics we shall here ask this one question: What is a thing? The question is quite old. What remains ever new about it is merely that it must be asked again and again.
In this article, our way of asking about things is focused on the mereological aspect of things, i.e. the relationship between parts and wholes. The point of departure is that, at the very least, a part affects a whole: "when you pull on a part, the rest comes with." For example, wherever my left hand is, my right hand is not too far away. A whole then, has the property that it coordinates constraints-or said another way, it enables constraints to be passed -between parts. In this article, we present a logic for constraint passing.
Our approach has roots in categorical logic, and in particular Lawvere's observation that existential and universal quantification can be characterized as adjoints to pullback, in any topos. In particular, a system, or more evocatively a behavior type B S , will be an object in a topos [4] . Since we don't expect our audience to know any topos theory, and since all the ideas we describe will make sense in any topos, we will use the language of sets through this paper, and leave experts to make the topos-theoretic translation themselves.
We work behavior-theoretically; to paraphrase Gump, "X is as X does". Given a system for which B S is its set of possible behaviors, we define a part to be a quotient of B P , i.e. a surjection B S ։ B P from the behavior type. This surjection describes how a behavior of the entire system determines a behavior of the part, and any behavior of the part qua part must extend to the behavior of the whole: for any behavior of my hand, there exists at least one compatible behavior of my whole body. Given a behavior on one part, we can consider all possible extensions to the whole, and subsequently ask how those extensions restrict to behaviors of other parts. In this way one part may constrain another.
To describe the logic of these constraints, we introduce two new logical operators, or "intermodalities", closely related to the classical "it is possible that" and "it is necessary that" modalities, known as the alethic modalities [3] . Given a constraint φ on some part P , we view it as a predicate on-i.e. a subset of-the set B P of P -behaviors. We may ask whether satisfying this predicate is compatible with, or whether it ensures, various behaviors on another part B Q : the constraint φ is passed in these two ways from P to Q. To be a bit more explicit, the first new operator is called is compatible with, written ♦ P Q φ. This describes the set of behaviors in B Q for which there exists an extension in B S that restricts to some behavior satisfying φ. The second is the operator ensures, written P Q φ. This describes the set of behaviors in B Q for which all extensions to B S restrict to some behavior satisfying φ in B P . Our goal in this paper is to describe the properties of these inter-modalities ("inter" because they go from one part to another), and to demonstrate their utility with some elementary examples.
Systems and Their Parts: Behavioral perspective
When we constrain a part of a system, we are constraining what it does. This suggests that we should model a system by its type of possible behaviors, or behavior type.
Systems as behavior types
Luckily, we won't need to settle on what precisely a behavior type is, so long as we can reason about it logically. For this, we need the behavior type of our system and its parts to be objects in a topos; then, we can use the internal logic of the topos to reason about our behavior types. A topos can be understood as a system of variable sets; in our case, this allows us the freedom to have sets varying in time, in space, or according to different observers. As mentioned, however, to keep our language simple we'll just talk as if we're working in the topos Set of sets and functions. Thus a behavior type is simply a set whose elements are regarded as possible behaviors of a system. Example 1. We will present a few running examples of systems considered in terms of their behavior types. Let's introduce them now.
• Consider a bicycle. The bicycle pedals might be moving at some speed p, and the bicycle wheels might be moving at some speed w, both real numbers. If the pedal is pushing at a certain speed, then the wheels are moving at a least a constant multiple of that speed. Therefore, we will take the behavior type of our bicycle to be
for some fixed ratio r : R.
• Consider a glass of water placed in a room of temperature R. The glass of water has temperature T t : R for every time t : N. By Newton's principle, the temperature of the water satisfies the following simple recurrence relation:
Therefore, the behavior type of this glass of water is
• Consider an ecosystem consisting of foxes and rabbits. At any given time t : N, there are f t foxes and r t rabbits, where we mask our uncertainty about the precise population by allowing these to be arbitrary real values, rather than integer values. The population of the species at time t + 1 is determined by its population at time t, according to the relation R t (f, r) given by the following standard recurrences:
This is known as the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, but we could use any model. Here d f is the death rate of the foxes, b r is the birth rate of rabbits, and c f and c r are rates at which the consumption of rabbits by foxes affect their respective populations. From here, we take the behavior type of this ecosystem to be
• In algebraic geometry, we may think of the set of polynomial functions on a space S as the possible behaviors of S. Thinking this way, the polynomial ring R[x, y] is the behavior type of the affine plane R × R:
Parts as quotients of behavior type
If we know a whole system S (say, my body) is behaving like b, then we also know how any part P of S (say, my hand) is behaving: we just look at what P is doing while S does b. In other words, there should be a restriction function, which we denote P : B S → B P , from the behavior type of the whole system to the behavior type of the part. Moreover, every behavior of a part P will arise from some behavior of the whole system: how could a part of the system do something if the system as a whole had no behaviors in which P was doing that thing? Remember, we are considering the part P as a part of the system S, not on its own: my hand, not a severed hand. If we sever P from the system S, it may be able to behave in ways that have no extension to S. But as a part of the system S, every behavior of the P must be restricted from a behavior of S. We will give examples below, but first a definition.
Definition 2. The behavior type of a part of a system S is an epimorphism P : B S → B P out of B S . Thus we define the category of parts of B S to have as objects the parts of S and as morphisms the commuting triangles
Note that if a map B P → B Q exists, then it will be unique and an epimorphism, by definition of epimorphism in a category. Thus we write P ≥ Q and say that Q is a part of P if such a map B P → B Q exists. This is a preorder, which we refer to as the lattice of parts of S.
In practice, we may have certain parts of S in mind, and so we may consider a sublattice of that defined in Definition 2.
Remark 3. Definition 2 may look a little backwards. Usually a "part" is a subobject; here we have defined a part to be a quotient. What we have defined to be a part is often called a partition (of B S ).
What is happening here is a well-known "space/function" duality: we are not considering the system S as some sort of object in space, but rather its type of behaviors B S . Often, the behaviors B S of a system S may be realized as functions on some sort of space S; this gives us a contravariance in S, which we see in the definition of part Q is part of P if there is a map "going the other way," B P → B Q . For comparison, consider the situation in algebraic geometry where one has a contravariant equivalence between the categories of algebraic varieties and the category of reduced finitely presented algebras; an algebra consists of polynomial functions on a variety, which tells us the "possible behaviors" of this variety, relative to the base field. • The two parts of the bicycle under consideration are the pedal and the wheel. Explicitly, the behavior types of these parts of the bicycle are the types of all possible behaviors which arise as some behavior of the whole bicycle:
In this case, every real number is a possible speed of the pedal, and every real number a possible speed of the wheel.
• In the system Water of the cup of water sitting in the room, there is just one thing we are considering the behavior of: the cup. But, we can see this behavior at many different times. For every time t : N, we get a part Water t of the cup at time t with behaviors
In fact, for any set D ⊆ N of times, we get the behavior type of the cup during D:
• The ecosystem consisting of foxes and rabbits is more complicated than the cup, but the principle is the same. We can consider the system at different times, and restrict our attention to just foxes or rabbits as we please. In particular, we let Fox t be the system of foxes at time t, and Rabbit t be the system of rabbits at time t. These have behavior types
• In algebraic geometry, the parts of the plane R 2 under consideration are the algebraic subsets, i.e. the subsets carved out by algebraic equations.
is the algebra of polynomial functions where f is 0. This is the algebra of polynomial functions on the subspace {(x, y) : R 2 | f (x, y) = 0} of the plane. In the case that f = x 2 + y 2 − 1, then this subspace is the circle, and so we see that the behavior type of the circle is the quotient
An epimorphism P : B S → B P out of an object (in a topos) may equally be presented by its kernel pair, the equivalence relation on B S where
. We may call this relation observational equivalence; the behaviors b, b
′ with b ∼ P b ′ are observationally equivalent relative to P . This is clearest when thinking of P as some measuring device in a larger system; two behaviors of the whole system are observationally equivalent relative to our measuring device when it measures them to be the same. Two behaviors of my body are hand-equivalent if they are indistinguishable by looking at my hand; and two times are clock-equivalent when they read the same on the clock face.
There is essentially (i.e. up to isomorphism) no distinciton in a topos between a quotient of B S and an equivalence relation on B S . Thus we are defining parts of S to be equivalence relations on S-behaviors. This seems to be a novel approach to mereology, though we cannot claim to know the literature well enough to be sure.
Compatibility
Now we turn our attention to how behaviors of various parts of the system relate to one another. The most basic relation between behaviors of two parts is that of being simultaneously realizable by a behavior of the whole system. We call this relation compatibility.
Definition 5. If P and Q are parts of S, then we say behaviors a : B P and b : B Q are compatible, denoted c(a, b), if there is a behavior s : B S of the whole system that restricts to both a and b, i.e. c(a, b) :≡ ∃s : S. a = s P ∧ s Q = b. Generally, if a i : P i is some family of behaviors indexed by a set I, then this family is said to be compatible if there is an s : S such that s Pi = a i for all i ∈ I.
In other words, two behaviors (one on each of two parts) are compatible if there is a behavior of the whole system that restricts to both of them.
Example 6. Examples of compatible behaviors are easily obtained by restricting a single system behavior to two parts.
• In the bicycle example, we see that a speed p of the pedal is compatible with a speed w of the wheel if and only if w ≥ rp:
• In the cup of water example, a temperature T 0 : B Water t at time t is compatible with a temperature T 1 : B Water t ′ at a later time t ′ are compatible if and only if T 1 follows from T 0 via the recurrence relation. In particular, if
• In the ecosystem example, we have a number a different comparisons to choose from. A fox population f 0 : B Foxt at time t is compatible with f 1 : B Foxt+1 at time t + 1 if and only if there is simultaneous rabbit population r 0 so that
Two simultaneous fox and rabbit populations are compatible if and only if there is some history of the ecosystem which achieves those population at that time. In particular, any two populations of foxes and rabbits at time 0 are compatible.
• In the algebraic geometry example, a part is an algebraic subset of the plane and its behaviors are the polynomial functions defined there. Two behaviors are compatible iff there is a function on the plane to which both simultaneously extend. For example, if p(x) is a behavior on the x-axis and q(y) is a behavior on the y-axis, and we have p(0) = q(0), then writing a := p(0) ∈ R, the behavior p(x) + q(y) − a on the whole plane restricts to each, and thus p and q are compatible. This is obviously a necessary condition: if p(0) = q(0) then no global function can restrict to both.
Compatibility and the lattice of parts
We can express some of the parts-lattice operations in terms of the compatibility relation.
Proposition 7. The meet P ∩Q of parts P and Q of S has behavior type given by the following pushout.
In other words, a behavior of P ∩ Q is either a behavior of P or a behavior of Q, where these are considered equal if they are compatible.
Dually, the join P ∪ Q has behaviors given by the image factorization of the induced map
In other words, a behavior of P ∪ Q is a pair of compatible behaviors from P and from Q.
Furthermore, the largest part ⊤ is S, and the smallest part ⊥ is the support (or duration, thinking timewise) of S, the image factorization of the terminal map. In the topos Set, ⊥ is empty if S is and singleton otherwise.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the universal property of the meet and that of the pushout are equivalent, and similarly for the top element ⊤. The other two claims (joins and bottom elements) are proved by an orthogonality argument; we focus on the join.
If B S ։ B R is a part with B R ≥ B P and B R ≥ B Q , we need to show B R ≥ B P ∪Q as defined above. But under these hypotheses there exists a solid-arrow a square
and by the orthogonality of epis and monos in a topos, there exists a dotted lift as shown.
When we say that all behaviors of P are compatible with all behavior of Q, we are saying that P and Q are disjoint as parts, i.e. that their meet is empty.
In general, we will be more interested in joins than in meets because joins are easier to work with (being subobjects of a product, rather than quotients of a disjoint union by a non-transitive relation).
Example 8. Let's consider some examples of joins and meets of parts.
• In the example of the bicycle, note that we have
since a behavior of the bicycle was defined precisely to be a behavior of a pedal and a wheel satisfying a compatibility constraint.
• 
• Similarly, in the ecosystem example, the parts of the ecosystem at various times are the join of parts at particular times. More interestingly, recall that every behavior of Fox 0 (starting population of foxes) is compatible with every behavior of Rabbit 0 (starting population of rabbits). Therefore,
This witnesses the fact that the parts Fox 0 and Rabbit 0 do not at all mutually constrain each other, and so have no shared sub-parts.
• Consider two algebraic subsets X and Y of the plane and let I and J be the ideals of polynomials which vanish on X and Y respectively. Then we know that B X = R[x, y]/I and B Y = R[x, y]/J. The join has behaviors
We note that B X∪Y is a ring with operations taken componentwise and that the restriction map B R 2 → B X∪Y is a homomorphism. The kernel is the set of those h : R[x, y] for which h + I = I and h + J = J, i.e. precisely those h ∈ I ∩ J. Therefore,
which represents the union in the usual geometric sense.
Determination recovers the order of parts
Definition 9. If P and Q are parts of S, and a : B P and b : B Q , then a determines b if every behavior s of the whole system S which restricts to a also restricts to b.
We say that a part P determines a part Q if every behavior a : B P , determines some behavior
This is a much stronger notion than compatibility, and we shall show in Proposition 11 that it can be used to recover the original order relation ≥ on parts.
Lemma 10. A behavior always determines uniquely:
Proof. We know there is some s : S which restricts to a. Since a determines b and b ′ , s restricts to both b and b ′ ; but then b = b ′ .
Proposition 11. For parts P and Q of S, the following are equivalent:
1. Q is a part of P , i.e. there is a surjection P ։ Q.
2. P c-determines Q, in the sense that for every a : B P there is a unique b : B Q such that a is compatible with b. In other words, ∀a : B P . ∃!b : B Q . c(a, b).
3. P d-determines Q, in the sense that for every a : B P there is a b : B Q such that a determines b. In other words, ∀a :
4. For all a : B P and b : B Q , if a is compatible with b, then a determines b.
Proof. This claim follows from the following implications.
(1 ⇒ 2): Recall that if Q is a part of P , then the restriction of s : B S to B P and then B Q is equal to the restriction f : B P ։ B Q straight to B Q . This immediately implies a : B P is compatible with f (a). For uniqueness, notice that if b : B Q is also compatible with a, then some s : B S restricts to both a and b. But s restricts also to f (a), so b = f (a).
(2 ⇒ 3): Suppose P c-determines Q. Then for a : B P , let b : B Q be the guaranteed unique compatible behavior of Q. If s : B S restricts to a, then a is compatible with s Q and so s Q = b; therefore, a d-determines b.
(3 ⇒ 1): By the lemma, a determines b uniquely; thus we get a function f : B P → B Q sending a to f (a) := b. Now, for any b : B Q , there is some s : B S restricting to it. By hypothesis, s P determines some f (a) : B Q ; but then s Q = f (a) so that b = f (a) and f is epi. Finally, if s : B S , then f (s P ) = s Q , so that Q is part of P .
(3 ⇔ 4): Since P and Q are both parts of S, for every a : B P , there is a b : B Q compatible with it. Thus 4 ⇒ 3. On the other hand, assuming 3 and that a is compatible with b, we know by 2 that b is the unique behavior of Q compatible with a, so that a determines b.
Example 12. Here are some examples of one part determining another; equivalently, these are examples of subparts of parts.
• In the example of the bicycle, neither the wheel nor the pedal determines the other.
• In the example of the cup of water, each temperature at time t determines the temperature at time t + 1 by the recurrence relation. Therefore, we have Cup t ≥ Cup t+1 by Lemma 11; in other words, a cup at time t + 1 is "part" of a cup at time t. This may seem odd, but remember that our notion of part is behavior-theoretic. In a deterministic world, the future is contained in-part of-the present. This can be seen from the perspective of Laplace's demon: the future is "present before its eyes"; it is part of the present.
• Since the ecosystem example is also a deterministic dynamical system, the analysis is the same as for the cup of water example.
• For the algebraic geometry example, the behavior of the unit circle determines the behavior of the part {(1, 0)}, but it does not determine the behavior of the x-axis because the function x 2 + y 2 and the constant function 1 have the same behavior on the circle but different behaviors on the x-axis.
Constraints, Compatibility, and Ensurance
In this section, we introduce our new logical operators, ♦ and , and prove some basic properties about them. We shall see in Section 3.2 that these two operators pass constraints between parts.
But first, what is a constraint?
Constraints as predicates
We will identify a constraint φ on a part P with the predicate "satisfies φ" on behaviors B P of P . In other words, we have the following definition.
Let Prop be the two element set {true, false}; more generally, it is the subobject classifier in the ambient topos.
Definition 13. A constraint on a part P is a map φ : B P → Prop. The type of constraints on P is Prop P .
Since we are working in a topos, a map from P to Prop is equivalent to a subobject of P . Hence a constraint on a part is hence a subquotient-a subobject of a quotient object-and this is equivalent to a quotient object of a subobject. While we won't need that fact here, we will make extensive use of the following fact, which is again true in any topos. For parts P ≥ Q, we get an adjoint triple that allows us to transform constraints on P to those on Q, and vice versa:
These functors are defined logically as follows:
We will write ∃ P , ∆ P , and ∀ P for ∃ S P , ∆ P S and ∀ S P respectively. As mentioned, these operations are functorial, meaning that ∃ P P (φ) = ∆ P P (φ) = ∀ P P (φ) = φ and for R ≤ Q ≤ P ,
Lemma 14. Recall that for part P of system S we write s ∼ P s ′ for the relation s P = s ′ P on B S . Then for any predicate φ on S we have:
Thinking again of P as a way to observe behaviors, ∆ P ∃ P φ is the set of system behaviors s that our observer says plausibly satisfy φ: there is something P -equivalent to s that satisfies φ. And ∆ P ∀ P φ is the set of system behaviors that our observer can guarantee satisfy φ.
The compatibility and ensurance operators
Now we turn to the question of how constraints on the behavior of some part of the system constrain the behavior of other parts. We discuss two ways to pass constraints between parts.
Definition 15. A constraint φ on a part P induces a constraint on a part Q in two universal ways:
• "Is compatible with φ":
• "Ensures φ":
A behavior q of Q is compatible with a constraint φ on P if Q can be doing q while P is satisfying φ; we write this as ♦ P Q φ(q). A behavior q of Q ensures φ on P if whenever Q does q, P must satisfy φ; we write this as P Q φ(q).
These symbols are chosen due to their relation to the usual modalities of possibility (♦) and necessity ( ) [3] ; a behavior q is compatible with φ if it is possible that P satisfies φ while Q does q, and a behavior q ensures φ if it is necessary that P satisfies φ while Q does q. Indeed, in the case that the accessibility relation in the Kripke frame is an equivalence relation, we will be able to recover the usual possibility and necessity modalities from our compatiblity and ensurance operators (see Section 3.6).
Note that compatibility and determination appear as particular, pointwise cases of the compatibility and ensurance operators. For any p : B P and q : B Q , we have
We write (= p) for the map B P → Prop that sends p ′ to true iff p = p ′ .
Example 16. We return to our running examples to see our new operators in action.
• In the example of the bicycle with gear ratio of r, we can ask what behavior of the pedal is ensured by the wheels moving slower than w = 2 mph. We have
• If the cup of water has temperature T 0 : Water 0 at time 0, then it cannot have a temperature further away from the ambient room temperature R at a later time. Therefore,
• Suppose that in the ecosystem example, one was given the goal of introducing a fox population at time 0 in order to keep the rabbit population in check after a given deadline d. Let's say that being kept in check means being between two fixed bounds, r t → inCheck(r t ) := k 1 < r t < k 2 so that inCheck : B Rabbitt → Prop is a constraint on rabbits at time t. The constraint of being kept in check for all times after the deadline d is the constraint
on the join t≥d Rabbit t . The goal may then be expressed as finding a starting fox population f 0 which ensures that the rabbit population is kept in check at all times after the deadline:
Example 17. We can see a higher-order ensurance in the ecosystem example. If there are any rabbits at time 0, and if the rabbit population is bounded independent of time, then the rabbits must ensure that there are foxes, and that the foxes ensure there are rabbits:
If there are no foxes, then the rabbit population is unbounded, and if there are foxes, then there must be rabbits for them to eat. We see that this ecosystem model exhibits a rudimentary form of symbiosis; though the foxes eat the rabbits, they counter-intuitively must ensure that the rabbits do not go extinct, lest they themselves go extinct.
As the internal logic of the topos Set is Boolean, in that it satisfies the law of excluded middle, our operators are inter-definable by conjugating with negation.
Proposition 18. Assuming Boolean logic, compatibility and ensurance are de Morgan duals. That is, ¬♦
Proof. The proof uses the law of excluded middle twice:
Note that Proposition 18 does not generalize to arbitrary toposes, where the variation of the sets (in time or in space) means that one must reason constructively in general.
Compatibility and ensurance as adjoints
We now develop the basic theory of the compatibility and ensurance operators. First, we observe that compatibility and ensurance are monotone and adjoint to each other.
Proposition 19. Let P and Q be parts of the system S and φ a constraint on P . Then:
1. If a constraint φ entails ψ, then being compatible with φ entails being compatible with ψ, and ensuring φ entails ensuring φ. That is, ♦ P Q and P Q are monotone. 2. If q ensures that P does φ, then q is compatible with P doing φ. That is, itself. In other words, ♦ P P φ = φ = P P φ. Proof.
1. As the composite of monotone maps, both maps are monotone.
2. Let φ : B P → Prop be a constraint on P . Suppose that P Q φ(q) for q : Q, that is that for all s : B S , if s Q = q, then φ(s P ). Since Q is epi, there is an s such that s Q = q, and therefore φ(s P ); so
3. This follows from the adjunctions ∃ Q ⊣ ∆ Q and ∆ P ⊣ ∀ P as follows:
4. Follows from the general properties of adjoints.
5. As ♦ P P and P P are adjoint, it suffices to show that just one is the identity. This follows from the fact that P is a quotient of S. Suppose P P φ(p); that is, for all s : S, s P = p implies φ(p). Since P is epi, there is some s that restricts to p, and therefore φ(p).
To make the adjointness of ♦ 
Interactions between three parts
Next we discuss how compatibility and ensurance compose, something like a triangle inequality for these inter-modalities.
Proposition 20 (Composition). Let P , Q, and R be parts of system S. Then:
1. If a behavior of R is compatible with a constraint on P , then it is compatible with a behavior of Q being compatible with that constraint. That is,
If a behavior of R ensures that a behavior of Q ensures some constraint on P , then that behavior of R ensures that constraint on P . That is,
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 14, since
Proposition 21 (Interaction of inter-modalities with meets and joins).
Proof. We prove the first two; the remaining two are dual. 2. This is mostly a matter of unpacking definitions:
Compatibility and ensurance between a part and subpart
When P determines Q, or equivalently Q is a part of P (see Proposition 11), we have the following additional properties.
Proposition 22 (Compatibility and ensurance of a part). Suppose that P ≥ Q. Then
Proof. Note that as S ։ P is epi, Thus compatibility and ensurance in the case of a part is simple: q : B Q is compatible with a constraint φ on P if there exists p : B Q that restricts to q and φ(p), and q ensures φ if all p that restrict to q obey φ. On the other hand, p : B Q is compatible with a constraint ψ on Q iff p ensures ψ iff p Q obeys ψ, and in fact this gives another characterization of the notion of part.
We may make slightly more general statements as follows.
Proposition 23. Suppose that P ≤ P ′ and Q ′ ≤ Q. Then
2.
Proof. This follows from the functoriality of ∃, ∀, and ∆.
Example 24. In the ecosystem example, we were trying to ensure that rabbits were kept in check after the deadline d:
Using the above lemmas, we can change this into a simpler form. First, since ensurance is a right adjoint (Proposition 19 item 3), we may rewrite our constraint as
and then, because inCheck(r t ) is more explicitly ∆ Rabbitt t≥d Rabbitt inCheck we may use Proposition 23 item 4 to rewrite this as ∀t ≥ d.
Rabbitt
Fox0 inCheck(r t ) In particular, we see that the suitability of a given initial fox population for keeping the rabbits in check may be determined by considering each time t ≥ d independently.
Compatibility and ensurance, possibility and necessity
Finally, we describe the manner in which our intermodalities generalize the classical alethic modalities of possibility and necessity.
Fix a part P . Then for any part Q, we obtain two modalities on P by composing our intermodalities from P to Q with their corresponding intermodality from Q to P . These modalities describe constraints on P as seen through the part Q. To obtain a description of possibility and necessity, assume that the terminal map B S → * is epi (the system is well-supported ). We let Q = ⊥ be the system whose behavior type B Q = * consists of just a single element. Then the adjoint modalities
describe possibility and necessity on B P . For example, for any constraint ϕ on B P , the constraint ♦ ⊥ P ♦ P ⊥ (ϕ) maps all elements of B P to true if there is some behavior p that satisfies ϕ, and maps all elements to false otherwise. Thus the modality detects whether ϕ is possible: that is, whether there is some behavior that satisfies ϕ.
On the other hand,
is the constraint that maps all elements of B P to true if all behaviors p : B P satisfy ϕ, and maps all elements to false otherwise; thus this modality detects whether ϕ is always satisfied, and hence necessary.
More generally, the usual semantics of the "it is possible that" and "it is necessary that" modalities ♦ and take place in a Kripke frame (W, A), where W is a set, known as the set of worlds, and A is a binary relation on W known as the accessibility relation. The predicate then ♦(ϕ)(w) holds if ϕ(w ′ ) for some w ′ such that wAw ′ , and (ϕ)(w) holds if ϕ(w ′ ) for all w ′ such that wAw ′ [3] . If A is an equivalence relation, then we may equivalently describe A by an epi W ։ W/A. In this case, we have ♦ = ♦ 
Outlook and conclusion
We have presented a logic that describes how constraints-restrictions on behavior-are passed from one part of a system to another. While we have presented this from a set theoretic point of view, we have taken care to use arguments that are valid in any topos (with the noted exception of Proposition 18, which only holds in boolean toposes). As a consequence, our logic retains its character as a logic of constraint passing across a wide variety of semantics. One possibly valuable notion of semantics is one that captures a notion of time. Indeed, behavior is best conceived as occurring over time, though of course the question of what time is remains an issue. One can imagine that a system has, for any interval or "window" of time, a set of possible behaviors, and that each such behavior can be cropped or "clipped" to any smaller window of time. This is the perspective of temporal type theory [5] . While that work uses topos theory in a significant way, the main idea is easy enough.
Whether we speak of a bicycle, an ecosystem, or anything else that could be said to exist in time, it is possible to consider the set of behaviors of that thing over an interval of time, say over the ten-minute window (0, 10). Above we often discussed an idea which can be generalized to any system S that exists in time. Namely, we can consider different parts of time as parts of S. Given any behavior s over the 10-minute window, we can clip it to the first minute s (0,1) ; this gives a function S(0, 10) → S(0, 1), which is often called restriction, though we will continue to call it clipping. Let's assume that every possible behavior at (0, 1) extends to some behavior over the whole interval-i.e. that the universe doesn't just end under certain conditions on (0, 1)-behavior-at which point we have declared that the clipping function is surjective, and hence gives a part in the sense of section Definition 2. We call it a temporal part.
What then does it mean to pass constraints between temporal parts? The idea begins to take on a control-theoretic flavor: behavioral constraints at one time window may be compatible with or ensure constraints at other time windows. A mother could say "doing this now ensures no dessert tonight". The child could ask "is our position on the road now compatible with me playing with Rutherford this afternoon?" A control system could attempt to solve the problem "what values of parameter P can I choose, 5 seconds from now, that are both compatible with current conditions and ensure that in 10 minutes we will achieve our target?"
In any case, as mentioned in the introduction, our original goal was to understand what makes a thing a thing, e.g. what gives things like bricks the quality of being cohesive (not two bricks) and closed (not the left half of a brick). We believe that a good logic of constraint passing between parts is essential for that, but perhaps not sufficient. The question of what additional structures need to be added or considered in order construct a viable notion of thing, remains future work.
